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IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

DYNAPAC, INC., a Utah corporation,
and TRACY COLLINS BANK AND TRUST
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
-.,.

Plaintiff-Respondent,
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)
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Case No. 14243
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INNOVATIONS, INC., a Utah
corporation, JOHN CUNNINGHAM,
and ROBERT E. OVERTREE,
Defendant-Appellant.
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APPELLANT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant moves to set aside the default judgment
entered against him in the court below on the grounds that an
agreement existed between appellant and counsel for respondents
not to take a default judgment until notice was given to appellant, that service of process was fatally defective, that no
evidence as to the sum for which appellant was allegedly liable
was presented to the court to support any judgment.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Respondents
obtained a default judgment against the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
appellant.

Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The appellant appeared and moved to set th<= flpfanlf

- 2 judgment aside and to quash the original service of process upon
appellant, and for leave to file a proposed Answer to contest
the allegations of the Complaint on their merits.

The Honorable

Stewart M. Hanson, Sr., presiding in the lower court, first granted
the Motion, then on a rehearing on an Amended Motion to Set
Aside, together with a Motion to Quash, denied both Motions.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks to reverse the denial by the lower
court of the Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment and the
Motion to Quash Service of Process filed by the appellant, and
to have appellant's proposed Answer filed and to proceed with a
trial on the merits as to the allegations of respondents • Complaint.

•

* • '

- •- -' 'l-

STATEMENT OF FACTS .
The Complaint of the respondents was filed on December
7, 1973, (R. 106-119), the first claim of which alleges only
that the appellant and the defendant Cunningham, upon the default
of certain payments by the defendant Innocations, Inc., had the
obligation to endorse all of their stock to the American National
Bank to be held pursuant to escrow instructions referred to as
Exhibit "C'\ which was alleged to be attached to the Complaint,
but, in fact, is not attached to the Complaint.

Also said claim

alleges liability on the part of appellant growing out of the
signing of Exhibit "B".

Exhibit "B" (apparently a modification

agreement at p. 119) is attached to the copy of the Complaint, and
names appellant as a party, but said Exhibit shows no signature
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
or contractual
dutiesMachine-generated
or obligations
on the part of appellant.
OCR, may contain errors.

- 3 The only duty that the second claim for relief alleges on the
part of appellant is that he jointly, along with the defendant
Cunningham, would endorse all of the stock that each had in

^

Innovations, Inc., in the custody of American National Bank in
the event of default of a certain obligation by the defendant,
Innovations, Inc.

An allegation of default by Innocations, Inc.,

upon said obligation is made in the First Claim for Relief.

In.

the Second Claim for Relief an allegation is made that Cunningham,
appellant and Innovations, Inc., have refused and now refuse tol
deliver 94% of the stock of Innovations, Inc., to Stokermatic.
No allegation therein is made of the reasonable value of this

:

stock; however, an allegation is made that Cunningham and appellant are "liable to Stokermatic for payment of the amount owing
••:•;. ^-;:i

pursuant to the agreement."
•

:
{

• » *; . - ..

Referring back to the "Agreement", there is no allega-

tion that appellant is liable in any way on Exhibit "A" attached
to plaintiff's Complaint, and none of that portion of Exhibit "B"
attached to its Complaint describes any obligations by appellant
as a party thereto.

r A'

a.L r

:

• :* .> .1:

f

r

Likewise, in the First Claim for Relief, no allegation
is made that appellant had any other obligation under the Modification Agreement other than to transfer and deliver 94% of the
outstanding stock of Innovations, Inc.

No allegation is made

therein that the agreement provides that appellant was to be
personally liable for a debt of Innocations, Inc., in the event
of default of the defendant Innovations, Inc.

Likewise, in the

Second Claim for Relief, no allegation is made that the appellant
had an obligation to pay the debts of Innocations, Inc.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In the

- 4 e v e n t of failure to transfer the stock, appellant's liability is
limited to that "owing pursuant to the a g r e e m e n t . "

T h e Third Claim

for R e l i e f alleges only liability on the part of t h e d e f e n d a n t
Cunningham.
1

vmade

: :-•/! r,•-.:;:.;:-... ?-;* ,••...>

_:•..••.•-

. . . .

: •' - In the Fourth Claim for Relief an allegation is

that appellant, along with Cunningham, used the corporation

for the purpose of defrauding Stokermatic without specifying in
r-what. way any kind of a fraud was committed.

The Fifth Claim for

Relief of plaintiff refers to the allegations of the First Claim,
then makes the bare allegation that Cunningham and appellant ..
personally guaranteed payment of Innovations, Inc.'s obligations
to Stokermatic but makes no claim that the guarantee was in writing.

The Sixth Claim for Relief makes the allegation that the

defendant Cunningham and appellant wrongfully obtained the stock
certificates of Innovations, Inc., in question from American
National Bank, and makes a further allegation that defendants
are liable to Tracy or to Stokermatic for the value of the stock
as of the date the certificates were released. ":

:- :^-v.;--.!.

T h e Sixth Claim is a claim f o r u n j u s t e n r i c h m e n t
of the d e f e n d a n t s , m a k i n g t h e allegation t h a t "the r e a s o n a b l e
v a l u e of t h e b e n e f i t to the d e f e n d a n t s is u n k n o w n , b u t w i l l b e c o m e
k n o w n during the c o u r s e of this a c t i o n . "

^

./ r > ^ ; J

T h e prayer o f said C o m p l a i n t asks f o r J u d g m e n t
in t h e name of S t o k e r m a t i c in the sum of $ 3 8 , 8 9 0 . 8 1 plus

interest

" a t the rate of 1 0 % p e r annum, and for the p l a i n t i f f T r a c y C o l l i n s
B a n k & T r u s t C o m p a n y for the return o f certain shares of stock
of I n n o v a t i o n s , I n c . , or in the a l t e r n a t i v e , t h e v a l u e o f that
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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stock as of October 23, 1969.

All of the foregoing were

;.

;

abstracted from the Complaint, (Record 106 to 119).
v

\

; o •;•<• The Affidavit of Service by a deputy marshall

in the County of Los Angeles shows service on the appellant at
4067 Cody Road, Sherman Oaks, California, and makes no mention
of endorsing upon said Summons the date served or said marshal's
name and title (R 104 R 105). Defendant, John Cunningham,
was served on February 26, 1974, (R 103). The defendant,;
Cunningham, moved to dismiss plaintiff's Complaint on March
15, 1974- (R 86, 87 and 88). A default certificate as tov.
appellant only was filed on the 25th, of March, 1975, (R 85) .

;

On May 19, 1974, the plaintiff's attorneys, Gordon Roberts
and William Crawford, appeared before the Honorable Judge Hal •
.Taylor.

The only action taken was that of plaintiff being

granted a Judgment as prayed against the defendant, Robert E.
Overtree (R 8 4 ) . No documentary proof was offered, submitted
or withdrawn and there is no indication that any person was
sworn to testify with respect to the value of stock or any other
matters.

The formal Judgment was entered by the Court on the

:17th day of May, 1974, in the sum of $43,444.67, and it is
recited in the Judgment that said Judgment was entered against
said defendant, Robert E. Overtree,"pursuant to prayer of
Complaint on file herein." (R 81)

Thereafter on May 24, 1974,

the defendant, John Cunningham's, Motion to Dismiss was continued
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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without date (R 76). Thereafter on June 17, 1974, a Default
Judgment was entered against the defendant, Innovations,•Inc.,
in the sum of $43,761.27, also (R 7 0 ) . Thereafter on August 8,
1974, defendant, Cunningham's, Motion to Dismiss was continued .
without date, on stipulation and motion of defendant's counsel,
counsel for neither party being present (R 68). Thereafter on
August 19, 1974, the defendant, Robert E. Overtree, moved ;
the Court, pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, for an Order setting aside the Default Judgment

on :.:

the grounds and for the reason that Judgment was entered erroneously and because of mistake, inadvertence, surprise and excusable
neglect together with an Answer denying various matters along with
various affirmative defenses (R 64) together with an Affidavit, ;
(R 61) which sets forth essentially that the defendant, Overtree,
was served on or about the 24th day of January, 1974, and referred
the matter to an attorney in Utah, Delwin Pond, with instructions
to file an Answer, and about thirty (30) days thereafter learned
that Mr. Pond had neither filed an Answer nor handled the matter
any further.

Whereupon the Affiant called the attorney for the :

plaintiffs, Gordon Roberts, and requested an extension of time in
which Mr. Overtree was to obtain counsel to file an Answer on his
behalf, during which conversation Roberts stated to him that before
any default would be entered, that Mr. Roberts would give him
notice of his intention to take a Default Judgment (R 6 2 ) . On the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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3rd day of September, 1974, appellant's Motion to Set Aside
the Judgment came on and was continued to September 9, 1974,
at 2:00 P.M.

(R 58). On September 6, 1974, an Affidavit was

filed by Gordon L. Roberts for Respondents (R 54 55) in which
Mr. Roberts admits having a telephone conversation with Mr.

—,

Overtree at a time after the entry of the, "Default," but before,
entry of the Default Judgment as follows:

"Wherein Mr. Overtree

was advised by affiant that default had in fact been entered,
but that the Default Judgment had not yet been entered.

Affiant

did advise Mr. Overtree that before entry of a Default Judgment
there would be further communication." (R 54 55 emphasis added)
Subsequent to that telephone conversation, Roberts was con-

;

tacted by Sumner J. Hatch, an attorney in Salt Lake City, State
. of Utah,, and was advised by Mr. Hatch, that he had been retained
to represent appellant.

Approximately two (2) weeks passed

and no action was taken, so the affiant called Sumner J. Hatch. f
to ask whether any action was to be taken.

Mr. Hatch advised

: affiant that he had not received a retainer which he had

.: f

.. ^requested from Mr. Overtree, and that as far as he was concerned,
he was not representing Mr. Overtree any further.

Roberts then

advised Mr. Hatch that he intended to enter Default Judgment
inasmuch as a substantial time had elapsed since the entry of
the default.

: '
This affidavit shows that at no time did

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.

Gordon Roberts further
communicate
with
Machine-generated
OCR, may contain
errors.appellant or any person

-8actually representing appellant that Roberts intended to take a .
Default Judgment against -appellant'as Roberts had said that he would
do in his telephone conversation as set forth in his Affidavit.
;

• -~ c;:/

:

;

Appellant's Motion to Set Aside the Default

Judgment then came on on September 9, 1974, and was granted by a
Minute Entry (R 53) V

Thereafter, on the 10th of October, 1974, ...

defendant, Cunningham 1 s, : Motion to Dismiss was stricken, and an x
Answer was filed by defendant, Cunningham, on October 15, 1974
(R

45)..:

-:"'-' •' r.K

HIS-'

'••••

-::-r

•;-•

J.?*.-'

:

^

—

>.T

• :.

;*:; ;

. - *

''.''™.:': J„ '~J^':1 '•'",'/..-V:l.J-r_ _.""-;• . On..December, 18, 1974, the trial court .
signed an Order (R! 42) reciting that the Motion of appellant :
was re-heard on stipulation of counsel, and then nullified the -;•
Minute Entry and ordered appellant's counsel to file an Amended
Motion withiri five (5) dayk.

!

Thereafter/ on -December 26, 1974, an

Amended Motion to Set Aside was filed listing as grounds that
Overtree had an understanding with plaintiffs 1 counsel that further
communications from said counsel would be had before a default was
to be entered, and no such communication was made, that no written
agreement to guaranty any obligation of the defendant, Innovations,
Inc., was ever introduced into evidence, that no testimony was
adduced at the default hearing to prove any unliquidated sum claimed
by plaintiff as to the defendant, that service of process should
be quashed because of failure to comply with Rule 4 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, and further that the defendant had a good and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Thereafter, on April 2, 1974, a Motion to
Quash Service of Process for failure to comply with Rule 4 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was filed together with a
true copy of the copy of the Summons actually served on
Overtree (R 34). Both the Amended Motion to Set Aside
Judgment and the Motion to Quash were heard on April 30, 197 5..
On August 1, 1975, an Order was entered denying defendant,
Overtree 1 s, Motion to Set Aside, thereafter, a Motion to Amend
the Order of August 1, 1975, was filed on August 8, 1975, which
was by Minute Entry denied on August 14, 1975.
appeal ensued.

Thereafter, this

..-..THE COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO ENTER

THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST APPELLANT BECAUSE THE RETURN OF
SERVICE FOR THE SUMMONS AS WELL AS THE COPY THEREOF SERVED UPON
APPELLANT DID NOT COMPLY WITH RULE 4(j) OF THE UTAH RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE., . .,. , •..-..->

.• . - •

.

.

.

,, •.

,.....,.,....

.„;..,..,..:... Failure to comply with Rule 4(j) of the Utah.
Rules of Civil Procedure is jurisdictionally defective as to a
Judgment entered against a defendant based upon such a return.
The requirements of service of a Summons enunciated in Rule 4(j)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure existed previously in the
statutory law of Utah under sec. 104-5-7, Utah Code Annotated
(1943), and was adjudicated for the first time in Thomas v.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-10-

District Court, 110 U 245, 171 P2d 667 (1946), wherein it was
admitted by the defendant that he had been served with a copy of
the summons upon which no date whatsoever was placed as required by
The trial court denied the'defendant1s Motion to

said section.

Quash Service of Process and gave the defendant two (2) days in "
which to plead.

On Appeal, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the '

trial court on the sole ground that the person serving the Summons
had failed to endorse upon the copy or copies he shall deliver to
the defendant at the time of service, the date
was

s e r v e d . ' " •'-••"•: •••.

*•'

-'- *: " ••*>•••..

- \-v

upon which the same

:^.^-.^.. • v-:...^ >. •..;•.;JK_.;-. v«y.

The Court, in this opinion, carefully noted
several' cases' involving irregularity in the service of the Summons,
and the argument by the plaintiff that the defendant must affirmatively show that he was mislead by the failure to follow the statute.
"Such is not the provision of the Statute," replied the Court.

The

case law which had been decided at the time of the 'Thomas*''decision
stood for the proposition that where there was a statutory requirement
for the wording of a summons or for the service of a"summons, and
such requirement had not been followed and could not be cured by,
amendment, that service of process must be quashed, and any Judgment
upon which such a defective service is based is void.

See Columbia

Trust Co. v. Steiner, 71 U 498, 267 P 788; Grant v. Lawrence, 37 U
450,

108 P 931, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 280; Wasatch Livestock Loan v. '

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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District Court, 86 U 422, 46 P2d 399; Winters v. Hughes, 3 U 4 4 3 ,
24.P 759;,Miller v. Zeigler, 3 U 17, 5 P 518; State Tax Commission
v. Larsen, 100 U 103, 110 P2d 558; Reese v. Judges 52 U 520,
175 P 601; James v. Jensen, 50 U 485, 176 P 827; Glasmann v. . . , .
District Court, 80 U 1, 12 P2d 361.
,

The wording of sec. 104-5-7 of the Utah Code

Annotated 1943 at the time of the Thomas decision was as
follows:

',.'v •'=••/

...
t

-,*••*• , :• :-r«-

"Any officer, or other person authorized
to serve a summons, who serves the same, shall,
at the time of the service thereof, endorse upon .
the copy or copies of such summons which he shall

..

- deliver to the defendant or defendants in such
action the date upon which the same was so served,
and sign his name thereto, and add, if an officer,
his official title." (Emphasis added.)

• .. t

...

•. .

The foregoing statute was repealed in 1951, and the following
wording was adopted for Rule 4(j) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure:

•

"(j) TIME OF SERVICE TO BE ENDORSED ON COPY.
At the time of service, the person making such
. t .- - ^.
service shall endorse upon the copy of the summons
left for the person being served, the date upon
which the same was served, and shall sign his name
thereto, and, if an officer, add his official
title."
(Emphasis added.)
The principal announced in Thomas has been

followed by the Utah Supreme Court in cases since the adoption
of Rule 4(j) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

See Rees v.

Scott, 8 U2d 134, 329 P2d 877 (1958); Utah Sand & Gravel v. Tolbert,
16 U2d 407, Digitized
402 byP2d
703W. Hunter
(1965);
.Woody
v. Law
Rhodes,
the Howard
Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark
School, BYU. 23 U2d 249,
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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461 P2d 465 (1969; Martin v. Nelson,
-• -:

, •

..'V".

U

, 533 P2d 897 (1975).

On March 29, 1972, the Utah Supreme Court

amended many of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; however, no
amendments were-made as to Rule 4(j). If any synthesis could be
drawn from all of the cases cited as to service of summons, it would
be that from the Thomas case where the Court, quoting from a Michigan
case at p. 671: ''-"•'' "

'"

'

-'-'- i -- :. r ••

;

•

:

- -••••-

-• -••••

"It is the general rule, that, if a
statute prescribes a method for service of
process, the method must be followed."

k

There is no dispute in the record that the requirements of Rule 4(j)
were neither attempted or met, nor did the return of process show
that they were.

Therefore, under the cases above, the Third Judicial

District Court did not have jurisdiction over the defendant, Robert E.
Overtree, at the time that it entered the Default Judgment on May 17,
1974.

It necessarily follows that the Court below erred in denying

the Motion to Quash Service of Process and Motion to Set Aside
Default Judgment filed by appellant.

*-~

' L '''".'

^

i
i-.-Ji:^^:™^..:..«^-.THE C O U R T B E L O W E R R E D I N I T S D E N I A L O F
~r % , -: • : c : ' * . -' .
- _j; . _; '*
THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT OF THE DEFENDANT,
BECAUSE ADEQUATE GROUNDS WERE SHOWN PURSUANT TO RULE 60(b) OF THE
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
The record below shows that the plaintiffs proceeded
against the two individual defendants for a debt of a corporation
and for the alleged
the
two
individual
defendants
Digitized by thejoint
Howard W. liability
Hunter Law Library, J.of
Reuben
Clark Law
School,
BYU.
Machine-generated
may contain
errors.
- --*-— -p-n OCR,
in>Cunningham, the other
QQ f n act.
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individual defendant in the instant case, v/ho had signed the first
agreement between the parties, had filed a Motion to Dismiss
the plaintiff's Complaint in this matter which had not been disposed of at the time of the first hearing upon the Motion to Set
Aside of the defendant, Overtree.

Interrogatories filed by the

defendant, Cunningham, on June 4, 1975, had not been answered by ,
the plaintiffs even as of the date the defendant, Overtree, filed
this Appeal. :
,, .,...

r

- .
-

.

_ v

.;

The Affidavits of Roberts and Overtree reveal that

the only real conflict between their versions of what occurred is
that Overtree says that he called Roberts about thirty (30) days
after the service of the Summons and Complaint upon his.

Roberts

says that it was after March 25, 1974, which was the day upon
which the Default Certificate was entered as to Overtree.

There

is no question but what Roberts admits by his own Affidavit that
he agreed to give Overtree notice prior to taking a Default

-

Judgment; however, Roberts says that he told Overtree that his
"default" had already been entered.

To a layman, it is submitted

that the word, "default," would be a meaningless term.

The words,

"default judgment," are the words that really matter, and these
are the words which Roberts used when he told Overtree that notice
would be given to Overtree prior to a Default Judgment being
taken.

Thereafter, the record shows that although Roberts told

an attorney that the plaintiff would take a Default Judgment against
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-14Overtree, that attorney had just told Roberts that he did not represent
Overtree'.

It would have been a simple matte'r for Roberts to have

then sent a letter to Overtree advising the defendant that the plaintiff intended to take a default; however, Roberts failed to take any
such action then went to the Court and applied for a Default Judgment
against Overtree, which was a breach of the agreement that he had
made with Overtree, ••-•*--:*'•

••

.•*•*• " • /;;.„". . :\...

Such conduct on the part of an attorney
toward a layman, is reprehensible because it shows lawyers as
a profession as being sharp dealers, not persons of their word, and
ready to take advantage "of a layman.

It can be said in answer to

such a charge that Overtree should have reatined another attorney
when he learned that the attorney for the corporation, Pond, had •
not filed an Answer.

However, that is what Roberts should have told

Overtree, rather than to have made an agreement which he did not
honor.

The legal profession is increasingly being scrutinized by

consumer groups and legislative bodies in recent years, the Courts
and Bar Associations should enforce fair dealing between lawyers and
laymen.

If not, these institutions may lose the control they have

to the legislature.

These are cogent reasons to include such con-

duct by a lawyer to a layman under Rule 60(b) (7).
The law in Utah has always been that
where the Court is in doubt as to whether to set aside a default,
that doubt should
be resolved in favor of a trial on the merits.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In^Utah Commercial and Savings Bank v. Trumbo, 17 U 198, 53 P 1033
(1898), the ...defendant' s attorney withdrew without filing an
Answer because the defendant failed to.pay.his fee because the.
defendant did not ..receive the attorney's letters asking for
such fees. ...There was. no arrangement made with plaintiff's.
counsel by the defendant and. plaintiff's counsel had not made
any statements to the defendant as to notice before a default ,
as.in.the instant case.

The trial court refused to set aside

the default judgment and the Utah, Supreme Court on Appeal

. ,...

reversed the.trial court, holding such a ruling to be an abuse ..
of judicial.discretion saying of that discretion:,..

... , • . ... .. *

.,:

"It is. an impartial legal discretion,, which
.. .,. ^ ._
cannot be employed to the injury of any subject,
....
. but must.be exercised fairly, reasonably, and
.',s ....,,
in accordance with the established principles
.„of law. The power of the court to set aside
judgments by default is recognized and conferred .in section 3005,,Rev. St, 1898, and , .,.. r. ,,_.-. «* / ,
should be liberally exercised, for the pur**
_....., pose .of,.directing proceedings and trying
causes upon their substantial merits; and
_
where the circumstances which led to the
lr ...
default are such as to cause the court to
hesitate, it is better to resolve the doubt _ .. ,...„._ : .,
'in favor of the application so that a trial
- .. - may be secured.on the merits." (Emphasis added.)
. w
>-s

r

. The rule announced by this. Court in, Trumbo .... r.,

has been followed by this.Court and has.not been over-ruled.
Security Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Henry E. West, Jr., 20 U2d
292, 437 P2d.214 (1968); Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Co.,
14 U2d 52, 376 P2d 951 (1962).

While these cases represent
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-16facts when the motion was filed within the three-month period of
Rule 60, this Court has always recognized the need for setting aside
a default for good cause in cases where the motion was not filed
within three (3) months such as in the case of Ney v. Harrison,
5 U2d 217, 922 P2d 1114 (1956), where "the motion to set aside the
judgment by the wife of a defendant who had answered and was contesting the case on its merits was granted even though eleven (11)
months had lapsed from the default judgment to the motion to the
motion to set aside and the reason that the wife had not'answered
is that she felt that a divorce decree between her husband and
herself would protect her.

In the instant case, the Affidavit of

the defendant, a resident of California, which was filed with the
Motion to Set Aside was dated the 6th day of August, 1974, within
the three-month period, and the motion itself was filed only two
(2) days after the running of the ninety-day period.
* I . T h e trial court upon the first hearing,
granted the motion then for some reason, changed its mind, because
of some alleged delay on the part of the defendant. Yet, from the
record,'it is easily seen that in every case where there was a
delay of time after the filing of the motion of the defendant,
Overtree, the plaintiffs filed further Affidavits supporting their
contention in the matter; Nothing is said by the Court about the
delay of the plaintiff -in getting a re-hearing of the motion of
this defendant from the 9th of September to the 17th of December,
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-17set aside the judgment, then as more grounds stated for the motion
of the defendant the trial court changed its position one-hundredand-eighty degrees.

The only progress made further in the case

against the other personal co-defendant, Cunningham, was the
filing of Interrogatories and the Request for a Trial Setting on
March 5, 1975. If the trial court had granted the motion of the.
defendant, Overtree, the trial of the matter would not have been
delayed as it had not been set for trial.
•, • -r

.- The result of the change of mind by the trial

court and denial of the appellant's Motion to Set Aside is to
allow the defendant, Cunningham, whose liability is,.from the
pleadings and agreements attached thereto, more primary than
that of the appellant, to have his day in court on the one hand
and on the other hand to clamp a rigid judgment of. $43,444.67

~

without any trial on the merits at a time when the granting of ,
such a motion would not have delayed any trial.
.

,

The proposed Answer of the appellant denies various

allegations of the Complaint as well as alleging affirmative
defenses vhich if proved would be meritorious defenses to the
action.

;

»

In addition, the Answer of defendant alleges that the

Complaint does not state claims against the appellant upon which .
relief can be granted.

The Complaint, in the First and Second

Claims alleges that the appellant based upon a "modification
agreement" which is incorporated into the Complaint but not :—
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-18attached thereto as alleged, failed to endorse and deliver certain
stock to American National Bank as a trustee to be held pursuant
to the terms of an escrow agreement alleged in paragraph 7d, which
is alleged to be attached to the Complaint, but not so attached.
No other right to said stock by any of the plaintiffs to said stock
is alleged.

It is submitted that such allegations are defective

because the agreements alleged to be incorporated by reference are
not attached to the Complaint.

The Third Claim for Relief makes

no allegations as to Overtree.

The Fourth Claim for Relief alleges

fraud, but does not allege specific acts as required by Rule 9(b)
of the Utah" Rules of Civil Procedure.

Such" a general allegation

is not sufficient to state a claim in fraud.

Price v. Union

Pacific, 4 U 72, 6 P 528. The Fifth Claim for Relief alleges all
of the allegations of the First Claim for Relief then alleges from
those facts that the appellant and Cunningham personally guaranteed
the obligations o£ Innovations, Inc., to Stokermatic.

Such an "

allegation flies' in the teeth of the agreements which are in fact
attached to the Complaint, as said agreements delineate the'
liability of the parties very carefully, and none of these agreements containwords of guaranty.

The Sixth Claim for Relief then

without being pleaded in the alternative, conflicts with the First
Claim for Relief and alleges that in fact Cunningham and the
appellant did deposit 53,626 shares each with the plaintiff, '
American National Bank, here again alleging and incorporating ' :
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Exhibits "C,r and "D" thereto, neither of which are attached to
plaintiffs1 Complaint, and makes no allegation as to what the
provisions of said escrow agreements were, nor does said claim ;
allege a breach of said agreements, but simply alleges that the
defendants "wrongfully or mistakenly" obtained said stock. As
to an action on a written contract, such a claim is defective.
Stephens v. American Fire Insurance Co., 14 U 265, 47 P 83;
Stephens v. Continental Insurance Co. of New York, 14 U 272,
46. p 1 1 1 8 .

......:..,,.

;,

.,;•;....

The Seventh Claim for Relief is for unjust
enrichment and must necessarily rest upon a wrong committed in
breach of the escrow agreements incorporated by reference in the
Sixth Claim, but not attached and not properly pleaded, or upon
an alleged mistake.

The general rule of law on restitution for

unjust enrichment resulting from a mistake is that a demand must
be made as a condition precedent to suit. See AmJur 1034, sec. 92.
No such demand is pleaded in the Complaint, hence such a Complaint
is defective as to unjust enrichment.

Certainly, there is

ample showing that the defendant has a meritorious defense to a
Complaint defectively pleaded, in addition to those matters
alleged in the Complaint.
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°

':

-

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT

THE MOTION O F APPELLANT*TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT BECAUSE
N O EVIDENCE W A S INTRODUCED A T THE DEFAULT HEARING TO SHOW THE
LIABILITY O F THE APPELLANT FOR THE VALUE O F THE CORPORATE STOCK
NOT ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT." *
•'f * ' L : ;•''•'•'""

•'•-•'-•.;•• r~ '{••> ^••••^-<

- • ••-., — .. •-.-.

° The main allegations of the Complaint

which directly involve the appellant have to do with alleged liability based upon the value as of October 23, 1969, of certain
corporate stock for which the plaintiffs make claim.

No testimony

was introduced at the default heciring and no allegation is made in
the Complaint as to the value of said stock.

A default judgment

rendered upon an unliquidated claim must be established by proof
on further proceedings, and until the amount is ascertained, there
is no final judgment.

Hurd v. Ford, 74 U 46, 276 P 908 (1929),

cited also in Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 U 416, 260 P2d 741"*
(1953) ? Freed v. Stoker,

U

, 537 P2d 1039 (1975).

Rule

55(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides for such
proceedings.

Without an allegation of a value in the Complaint,

or proof thereof, any award by a Court is sheer speculation.
'

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it is respectfully urged
that the trial court erred in refusing to set aside the Default
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Judgment where the court entering the Default Judgment had no
jurisdiction because of defective service of process; that
adequate grounds were shown to set said Judgment aside because
of misconduct of an attorney in dealing with a layman; the
appellant has meritorious defenses to an improperly pleaded
Complaint; and the Default Judgment against the defendant
for an unliquidated claim the value of which is not alleged in
the Complaint and is not based upon any evidence*

Accordingly,

this Court should set aside the Default Judgment against appellant/ allowing appellant's proposed Answer to be deemed as filed
and proceed to have this matter go to trial on its merits.
Respectfully submitted,
JOHN L. McCOY
Attorney for Appellant
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